

"The planes sighted in Cuba," he said, "attacked in perfect in-line formation and appeared to be operating against the freedom fighters in Coghino Bay and Matanzas from San Julian Air Force Base at San Antonio de los Banos, near Havana."

According to reports from recently defected Cuban air force pilots, 70 of the 200 Cubans who had been sent to Czechoslovakia for aviation training are still in Czechoslovakia. The remaining 130 have been brought back to Cuba, the reports say.

The defectors, according to the spokesman, said that the brevity of the pilots' training in Czechoslovakia gives reason to believe they did not complete their course.

"The air force base at San Julian," they said, "is the most guarded military installation around Havana, and only a handful of Cuban air force officers have been allowed to go near it."

The same air force defectors indicated that an unspecified number of Czech test pilots and gunnery instructors were stationed at San Julian Air Force Base.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I call attention to the first paragraph of the article, which attributes to "an unimpeachable Washington source" the statement that Russian Mig's were used in repelling the invasion attempt by Cuban exiles.

As the chairman of the Senate subcommittee which has been hearing from many witnesses who took part in either the planning or the operation of that invasion attempt, I can state that every official source from which we have heard has agreed that no Russian Mig's appeared in that action.

I do not know who "the unimpeachable Washington source" may be; but his statements are completely contrary to what our subcommittee has been told about that situation; and in the course of our hearings we have heard testimony from top-ranking officials in the Department of Defense, the State Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency.

In fact, Mr. President, I wish to say that we were offered no evidence that any Russian planes of any make were involved in the Cuban invasion. To the contrary, Mr. President, I am satisfied that the evidence is perfectly clear that the planes used by the Castro forces were United States and British planes, in origin, apparently supplied to Batista, when the United States wrote in American history the very unfortunate chapter of supporting with military arms the tyrant Batista in his misrule of Cuba.

I certainly have a right to make comment about the Batista regime, because I led the fight, here in the Senate, against American military support of Batista; and in my capacity as chairman of the Subcommittee on Latin-American Affairs, I warned the Senate and the country that we were making a grievous mistake. I was also the first Member of the Senate to protest the tyranny of Castro, because insofar as human rights and individual liberties are concerned, the totalitarian procedures of Castro are no different from the totalitarian procedures of Batista; it is a truism that two wrongs cannot make a right.

Mr. President, when Castro came into power, he took over the Batista planes, and they were American and British made planes. It is within the frame-

work of propriety to say that on the basis of information given at our hearing, I am satisfied that very, very few of those planes were used in repelling the Cuban invasion—less than half of the number of planes used by the Cuban exiles, although there was some difference in type. But that small number of Castro planes very quickly gained supremacy in the air, apparently because they were better planes and had better pilots.

That was a very unfortunate development, from the standpoint of the Cuban exiles, although as I have considered the complexities of the Cuban invasion, I have often wondered who might have thought of an answer to the question, "Suppose the Cuban exiles had won; where would we have been then; would we have been ready to take the necessary steps"—which I think would have had to have been military steps—"thereafter?"

But, Mr. President, be that as it may, I have a lurking suspicion that this "unimpeachable Washington source" might very well have been some of the Cuban exile pilots who were defeated by the Castro pilots in that wholly unfortunate maneuver, and that that may be what we call an alibi for a defeat.

Mr. President, if there had been any Russian MIGs, or, for that matter, any Russian planes, I do not have to tell the Senate that we would have heard about that from our official Government sources, because they, too, needed some alibis. But, to their everlasting credit, they presented what we have every reason to believe were the facts in regard to the air power which was used in that fiasco; and apparently that air power did not include either Russian MIGs or any other Russian planes.

But, Mr. President, I am disturbed about such newspaper articles as this one; and there are other articles of that sort—sometimes referred to as "dope stories" or "smoking-out stories" or "trial-balloon stories"; and I think we can probably expect more of them to appear. I am fully aware of the fact, as are other members of my subcommittee, that there is some disappointment, if not actual criticism and opposition, because of the fact that my subcommittee has been conducting executive hearings. Of course I believe we should. We hope to close them this week, or not later than the first part of next week.

The information we have received fully justifies, in my judgment, the unanimous decision of the committee to conduct executive hearings.

For the benefit of the press, or at least the critical segment of the press, I announce again that it is my intention, to recommend to the full Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that the transcript of record be transmitted to the President when the hearings are concluded, with the offer to place ourselves at his service and command if, after reading the transcript, he might wish to discuss any of the points raised in the manuscript with either members of the subcommittee or members of the full committee or with any individual members thereof.

It is my hope that, after such a report has been made to the President,

subject to his pleasure and his decision, a chronological summary might be published that will set forth, in step-by-step fashion, the events of that ill-fated adventure, so as to remove doubts and questions and unfair criticisms on the part of those in the public who are greatly puzzled as to how the adventure came about.

It seems to me only with the submission to the public of such a chronological summary, duly and properly edited from the standpoint of protecting the security of our country, can there be any basis for debate and discussion of the questions of policy.

I think such a summary would tend to end charges and countercharges and end the efforts to frighten the American people into unsound action.

I want to make very clear that, so far as the senior Senator from Oregon is concerned, the President is my Commander in Chief. This study was undertaken only to be of help to the President. We felt that in so doing we would also be carrying out our constitutional responsibilities to serve in an advise and consent capacity. And we have a responsibility to the voters to function as a check upon any administration, whether it is this one or any other one, in the field of foreign policy—recognizing that under the Constitution it is the President who is the administrator of foreign policy, but, in the last analysis, it is the inalienable and constitutional right of the American people to determine what that foreign policy shall be.

As a constitutional liberal, I shall, of course, always seek to prevent the development in the administration of this Government of any secrecy in the handling of the public business, unless it can be clearly shown that such secrecy is absolutely essential from the standpoint of protecting the security of this Republic.

It is sometimes difficult to tell just where the line of demarcation falls. It becomes a matter of judgment.

I have complete confidence in the judgment of my President. I am completely satisfied that he will exercise his discretion wisely. I am of the opinion that no one among us is more determined to maintain the system of governmental checks and balances than is the President of the United States.

It is my advice, and will continue to be my advice, in any report that I make to the President in regard to the Cuban matter, that he tell the American people everything they can be told, consonant with the security of our country, in regard to the Cuban invasion attempt, going back for more than a year, during the Eisenhower administration.

MUTUAL SECURITY

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I turn to another matter. I have a series of amendments that I propose to submit to the mutual aid bill, and I want to comment on each one of them.

The first is a very brief amendment. It reads:

It is the sense of Congress that an important contribution toward peace would be

called for a review of the actions of the Federal Reserve Board and the Open Market Committee, as reported in the Board's Annual Reports, and just this month, under the chairmanship of Representative PATMAN, the trend of testimony seemed to suggest that there was much to be desired in this area of publicity respecting the exercise of these great monetary powers—page 47.

The Commission on Money and Credit, noting that accurate information would probably be less dangerous than rumors being continuously circulated about Federal Reserve policy, stated:

Although there is no easy solution to this issue, the Commission believes that the Federal Reserve should follow the general rule that the public should be kept informed with reasonable promptness and with reasonable detail of the reasons for its policy decisions and actions in order to avoid misunderstanding and misinterpretation (p. 92).

Twelfth. In considering the solution to our balance-of-payments problem, the Joint Economic Committee, among other things, stated, in its annual report:

We recommend elimination of the dollar gold reserve requirement, now equal to 25 percent of Federal Reserve notes and deposits. This requirement is irrelevant to both the supply of and the value of the dollar, and removing the requirement will reinforce the President's pledge, made in his state of the Union message, that the full strength of all our reserves stands behind the value of the dollar for use if needed. (H. Rept. No. 328, 87th Cong., p. 39.)

The Commission on Money and Credit has arrived at much the same conclusions:

The Commission believes that threat of a confidence crisis would be greatly reduced if it were generally recognized, both here and abroad, that all of the U.S. gold is available to meet our international obligations. Any doubts about the U.S. policy should be removed by elimination of the gold reserve requirement at the earliest convenient moment so that all of the U.S. gold stock is available for international settlement.

Thirteenth. Upon a number of occasions we have commented on the need for coordination of monetary and fiscal policies, most recently in the Joint Economic Committee's annual report, where we state:

We would be remiss if we failed to observe that present coordination of monetary and fiscal policies appears to be less than desired. * * * In any case, the Nation cannot afford to have the highest policy-making bodies of the Federal Government following conflicting policies, supported though they may be by different assumptions as to what the economic facts are. (H. Rept. No. 328, 87th Cong., p. 37.)

The Commission on Money and Credit recognizes this problem sufficient to offer one possible solution, namely:

The FRB Chairman and Vice Chairman should be designated by the President from among the Board's membership to serve for 4 years coterminous with the President's.

Mr. President, I call attention to that recommendation and say that if it were to be carried out, the President of the United States would at this time have the power to appoint a chairman and a vice chairman of the Federal Reserve Board.

Again, I find some satisfaction in discovering that these diverse experts

gathered from the financial and business community have, after such thorough deliberation, come to much the same conclusions which some of us in Congress have been urging. I have listed only a few of them, I am sure.

But I hope that these conclusions will be noted by the financial community and writers and that they may now have the good sportsmanship to admit that our proposals were, in the main, sound.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Illinois for the speech he has just made. As usual, when the Senator from Illinois speaks, he conducts an educational seminar on any subject he takes up. The one he discussed tonight is most enlightening to those of us who had the pleasure of hearing it, and it will be very educational to those who read it.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Oregon yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

WABASH RIVER FLOODS

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, during the week of June 8 a delegation from Illinois and Indiana representing the Wabash Valley Association at Mt. Carmel, Ill., and the Wabash Valley Interstate Commission at Terre Haute, Ind., came to Washington to testify in behalf of necessary funds for the survey and other related flood control projects along the Wabash River and its tributaries. I understand that most of these businessmen and farmers traveled here at their own expense. On Wednesday of last week I appeared before the Senate Appropriations Committee in support of their Wabash Valley program.

My interest in this whole situation is by no means recent. The Senate Public Works Committee, back in 1956, adopted a resolution I submitted to cause a flood-control study to be made. Again, in 1958, the committee adopted another of my resolutions to enlarge the scope of the study and investigation to include the development and conservation of water and related resources in the Wabash River Basin.

Over the past 14 years this area of Illinois and Indiana has suffered great and severe losses from 11 major floods. The farmers in the Valley have had to plant two or more crops over the years. Emergency repairs to the damaged levees and other related projects caused by the floods last month are now underway in ten Indiana and five Illinois counties. Also the Army Engineers are furnishing teams to make a survey estimate of flood damage due to debris and silting of streams in the disaster area counties of both States for the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD an editorial published in the Mercury-Independent of Grayville, Ill., with respect to the damages in this area.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Grayville (Ill.) Mercury-Independent, June 15, 1951]

DAMAGES CAUSED BY MARCH FLOOD

The delegation from the Wabash Valley Association which went to Washington last week to ask for increased appropriations for

flood control told the public works subcommittees of the House and the Senate that damages caused by the March flood amounted to \$100 million.

This may appear to many folks to be an enormous sum and much higher than the loss sustained by Illinois and Indiana property owners. But who is in a better position to estimate the flood losses than George Gettinger, the executive vice president, who travels up and down the valley and talks to individuals as well as groups in the 80 or more counties in the immense watershed of the valley. He traveled 59,000 miles last year.

Losses by flood affect everyone. Everyone knows, of course, floods damage farms, that they cause even more loss to farmers if they occur during crop seasons. The March flood destroyed thousands of acres of wheat and clover, delayed farmers in preparation of ground for spring planting of corn and soybeans.

What many people do not realize is that tax bills of virtually everyone who pays local taxes are apt to be higher because of flood damages to public property. Floods damage local roads, State highways, city streets, bridges, and other public installations; taxes must be continued at present or higher levels, which may even be insufficient, to repair those damages.

All private business in the valley is affected. When farm crops and farm property are damaged, when public property must be repaired at high tax costs, when city folks driven out of their homes sustain damage to their homes and furnishings merchants ring up less sales on their cash registers. Who is in a position to deny the loss in the Wabash Valley is less than \$10 million this year?

There have been 11 major floods since 1947. The loss in each of those floods may not have been as high; but at half the estimate for this year the total amount is stupendous. They can be prevented. But they will not be prevented or stopped unless more and more people realize they are hit in their own pocket books there won't be enough pressure to convince Congress of the need for sufficient Federal appropriations.

The prosperity, even the livelihood of thousands in the valley, is directly dependent on how many people will join in the campaign.

NEWSPAPER ARTICLE ALLEGING USE OF RUSSIAN PLANES IN CUBAN INVASION

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, the early edition of the Washington Star of yesterday, June 19 carried an article headlined "Pilots of Migs in Cuba Know Their Business."

I ask unanimous consent that the entire article be printed at this point in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

PILOTS OF MIGS IN CUBA KNOW THEIR BUSINESS

NEW YORK, June 19 (NANA).—There is no doubt that Russian Migs were in action in Cuba during the recent invasion attempt, but it is not known with certainty who was flying them, according to an unimpeachable Washington source.

A spokesman for the Cuban Revolutionary Council here, a pilot himself, said that the planes' approach and strafe tactics were "highly professional," which would imply a training in formation flying for several years. "When attacking ground targets with either rockets or machineguns," he continued, "a high-speed plane of the Mig type has only from 2 seconds to a fraction of a second in which to fire."